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The Eichmann Case and the Distortion  
of History 
ELI M. ROSENBAUM* 
Good afternoon. It is a privilege to be here to participate in a 
program with so many distinguished speakers who have enlightened us 
so much with remarkable presentations today. It is a special honor to be 
in a room once again with one of my heroes, Justice Bach. Those of you 
who heard Justice Bach either last night or this afternoon will soon learn 
that he is not only my hero, but that he has been my teacher as well; 
you’ll notice that especially near the end of my remarks. 
I should preface those remarks by stating that the views I will 
express are strictly my own. They are not those of my employer, the 
United States Department of Justice, as these are matters that have not 
been considered by the Department of Justice—nor, I think, would one 
expect them to come within the Justice Department’s purview. 
The Adolf Eichmann case is an enormously positive landmark in 
the history of human rights enforcement and of the effort to seek 
accountability on behalf of the victims of genocide. The Eichmann case 
revived the world’s interest in the crimes of the Nazi regime and its 
European allies—interest that had already declined precipitously in the 
comparatively few years that had passed since the conclusion of the 
great Nuremberg experiment in the mid-to-late 1940s. Indeed, by the 
end of the 1950s, the last of the surviving convicted Nuremberg 
defendants had been released, including some of the men who had been 
sentenced to death there for leading the notorious Einsatzgruppen 
mobile killing units. (By the way, the last of those Einsatzgruppen 
officers—Martin Sandberger—died only last year, in Germany, more 
than half a century after his 1958 release and some 60 years after he was 
sentenced to death at Nuremberg.)  
 
* Edited transcript of the author’s oral remarks presented at the symposium “Perspectives on 
Genocide: The Adolf Eichmann Trial – Looking Back 50 Years Later,” held on September 16, 
2011, at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, California. 
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The Eichmann trial was probably more responsible, than was any 
other event, for the revival of prosecutorial interest in the Nazi cases in 
Germany, the United States, and in the lamentably few other countries 
that pursued a measure of justice in those cases after the 1950s. It was 
also a major factor in encouraging Holocaust survivors to speak 
publicly of their horrific experiences and in precipitating the birth of 
Holocaust studies as an academic discipline and Holocaust 
remembrance as an imperative in the Jewish world and beyond.   
Sort of picking up on Professor Browning’s theme of distortion, I 
regret to say, however, that from a lessons-learned standpoint, the case 
also has a very sad and even dangerous legacy, for it is emblematic, in 
my judgment, of the way in which history can be severely distorted and 
yes, on occasion, fabricated by individuals who either are careless in 
dealing with even so weighty a subject as the Holocaust, or who have 
agendas that they seek to advance through reckless or, sometimes, 
willful misrepresentation of provable historical facts. 
Egregious distortion and misrepresentation have occurred in at 
least three major facets of the history of the Adolf Eichmann case, 
namely: (1) the facts of Eichmann’s capture in Argentina in 1960; (2) 
the facts of the supposed role of U.S. intelligence in delaying that 
capture; and, most troubling of all, (3) the facts of Eichmann’s wartime 
role in, and his responsibility for, genocide. What is especially 
disturbing about this phenomenon is that, in each instance, the truth 
was, so to speak, in plain sight. 
Since this is a panel discussion, and we’re running late, I can offer 
only a summary treatment of these three aspects. 
I will begin with Eichmann’s apprehension. As is well known, 
Eichmann was captured in Argentina in 1960 by a team of Israeli 
intelligence agents directed by the late Isser Harel, the head of Israel’s 
foreign intelligence service, the Mossad. Harel disclosed many of the 
details of the daring mission in his bestselling 1975 book, The House on 
Garibaldi Street, and in a little-known expanded edition in 1997 that 
provided additional important details.1 Among the long-awaited 
disclosures in Harel’s original book was the belated identification of the 
source of the information that enabled the Israelis to track Eichmann 
down. Harel revealed that the initial lead was provided by a partially 
blind half-Jewish German refugee in Argentina named Lothar Hermann, 
 
 1. ISSER HAREL, THE HOUSE ON GARIBALDI STREET (1975); see also SHLOMO SHPIRO, 
Introduction to THE HOUSE ON GARIBALDI STREET (Routledge 1997) (1975) (an expanded 
edition of the work including Shpiro’s introduction).  
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whose daughter, as it happened, had been dating one of Eichmann’s 
sons. Harel further revealed that that lead had been provided by 
Hermann to a German prosecutor named Fritz Bauer and that Bauer, 
convinced that his own government would never obtain custody of 
Eichmann, not only tipped off the Israelis to Eichmann’s whereabouts 
and alias—Ricardo Klement—but repeatedly pressed Israeli authorities 
to mount an operation to capture him. Bauer was no longer alive when 
Harel’s book was released, but its publication has ensured that he 
received, albeit posthumously, the credit he deserves for his 
extraordinary actions. The expanded 1997 edition revealed that Bauer 
had acted with the secret blessing of Georg-August Zinn, the prime 
minister of the German state of Hesse, where Bauer was serving as 
district attorney. Bauer, Zinn, Hermann, and the Israelis who risked 
their lives to apprehend Eichmann justly share the credit for the 
achievement. 
Israel’s then-prime minister, David Ben Gurion, announced 
Eichmann’s capture and incarceration in Israel on May 23, 1960. The 
media learned almost immediately that the fugitive had been abducted 
in Argentina. A major international contretemps erupted, with 
Argentina lodging a formal complaint in the United Nations about 
Israel’s clear violation of Argentina’s territorial sovereignty. Under such 
geopolitically charged circumstances, it was politically useful at the 
time for the Israeli government to say as little as possible about how 
Eichmann was found and how he was captured. Into this informational 
void stepped a then comparatively little-known Holocaust survivor 
named Simon Wiesenthal.   
Wiesenthal had settled in Austria after the war, devoted himself, 
indefatigably, to trying to locate suspected Nazi perpetrators, including 
Eichmann, in order to relay the information to government authorities in 
Germany, Austria, and other European countries that possessed 
jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute. Wiesenthal, in an interview 
with The Times of London conducted just two days after Ben-Gurion’s 
announcement, spoke candidly. The Times reported that he “denied a 
suggestion that he personally had something to do with Eichmann’s 
arrest.”2 However, after months passed without the Israeli government 
 
 2. Secret Agents Seized Killer Nazi Abroad and Took Him to Israel, TIMES (London), May 
25, 1960, at 1. I am grateful to British author Guy Walters, who found and shared with me the 
Times article while researching his outstanding 2009 book, GUY WALTERS, HUNTING EVIL: THE 
DRAMATIC TRUE STORY OF THE NAZI WAR CRIMINALS WHO ESCAPED AND THE HUNT TO 
BRING THEM TO JUSTICE 300 (2010). The article is prominently mentioned in Walters’ book. 
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revealing how the operation had originated and been carried out, Mr. 
Wiesenthal seems to have correctly gambled that no one would recall 
that small press item, and, in October 1960, he began boasting to 
reporters that he had indeed been a participant in the operation.  
In fact, shortly before Eichmann’s trial began in 1961, Mr. 
Wiesenthal published a German-language book, the title of which, Ich 
jagte Eichmann, translates to I Hunted Eichmann, in which he explained 
that it was he who had deduced that Eichmann was in Argentina and 
that, in 1959, he had tipped off Israel’s ambassador in Vienna, 
Yehezke’el Sahar, about where Eichmann was. Here, in English 
translation, is what, according to his 1961 book, Mr. Wiesenthal had 
written to Ambassador Sahar, in 1959: “According to the story told by 
Eichmann’s children before they left [Austria], it seemed likely that 
they had gone to live somewhere in the Argentinian pampas, since they 
would be going to a big farm, where they could ride horses and have an 
‘uncle.’”3 
That was Wiesenthal’s account, published the year after the 
Israelis captured Eichmann in Argentina and the whole world learned 
that he had been in Argentina. There was, alas, one big problem with 
this account: It was a fabrication. But it was a story to which Wiesenthal 
clung and which formed the principal basis of his ensuing decades-long 
fame. Eventually, outraged that Wiesenthal was taking credit for a 
historic and dangerous mission in which he had actually played no part, 
former Mossad chief Isser Harel made available a copy of Mr. 
Wiesenthal’s actual letter to Sahar. Here, in English translation from 
the German, is what Wiesenthal actually had written to the Israeli 
diplomat, on September 23, 1959: 
The children’s school friends say that Eichmann’s three sons had 
told them—before leaving school—that they will be going to a 
property with vast lands, where one can also do horseback riding.  
Due to still additional ways of expressing themselves, the impression 
was that they might be talking about northern Germany.4 
Thus, as the Israelis were already preparing to grab Eichmann in 
Argentina, Wiesenthal wasn’t telling them to look there at all. Instead, 
 
 3. SIMON WIESENTHAL, ICH JAGTE EICHMANN 220 (1961).  
 4. Letter from Simon Wiesenthal to Yecheskel Sahar, Israeli Ambassador to Austria (Sept. 
23, 1959) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review) 
[hereinafter Wiesenthal letter]; see also ELI M. ROSENBAUM & WILLIAM HOFFER, BETRAYAL: 
THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE KURT WALDHEIM INVESTIGATION AND COVER-UP 451 (1993) 
(providing an English translation).  
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he was suggesting that they search for Eichmann in northern Germany! 
In his 1961 book, however, through the simple expedient of replacing 
the words “northern Germany” with “Argentina” in recounting the text 
of his 1959 letter, he was able to misappropriate to himself credit for 
one of the most important and sensational operations in the history of 
law enforcement.  
The truth was established in 1993 when, courtesy of Isser Harel, I 
published the text of Wiesenthal’s actual 1959 letter, along with the 
pertinent fraudulent text from his 1961 book, in my own book, on the 
Kurt Waldheim affair.5 (By the way, even if Wiesenthal had told the 
Israelis in 1959 that he believed Eichmann to be in Argentina, without 
more specific locational information and/or information on the alias that 
Eichmann was using, the information would have been virtually 
worthless. After all, Argentina was and remains, by land mass, the 
eighth largest country in the entire world, having nearly 3.3 million 
square kilometers of land within its borders.) 
Israeli writer Tom Segev recently authored an important biography 
of Wiesenthal. There are a lot of very significant revelations in it. 
Wiesenthal had died in 2005. Based on extensive research, including 
first-ever research conducted at Wiesenthal’s private archives, the book 
was published in this country last year by Doubleday.6 I was optimistic 
that Segev, who has long had a reputation for fearlessness in speaking 
uncomfortable truths, would do no less in his biographic treatment of 
Simon Wiesenthal. And Segev plainly knew the truth. Not only had he 
read my 1993 book, which is cited in his own book, he had spent a day 
with me in Washington discussing the Wiesenthal story while he was 
researching it.  
I had given him a copy of the 1959 letter from Wiesenthal to 
Ambassador Sahar—he already had a copy of the 1961 Wiesenthal 
book—and we had talked about the letter and about how it manifestly 
disproved the claims made by Mr. Wiesenthal in his 1961 book and in 
his writings and interviews over the ensuing four decades of his life. In 
fact, Segev cites this very letter in an endnote in his book, but he 
references it for an innocuous point that has nothing whatsoever to do 
with the truth of who provided the Israelis with the information that 
they used to track down and apprehend Eichmann.7 And, by the way, 
Segev’s book makes no mention of Wiesenthal’s 1960 London Times 
 
 5. ROSENBAUM, supra note 4, at 451. 
 6. TOM SEGEV, SIMON WIESENTHAL: THE LIFE AND LEGENDS (2010). 
 7. See id. at 143, 434 n.17. 
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interview, which had been publicized before Segev’s Wiesenthal 
biography came out, in a book that he cited in his own book.8 In 
promoting the book, Segev’s publishers renewed the false claim that 
Wiesenthal played a key role in the Eichmann operation, and Segev did 
likewise on the interview and lecture circuit. For shame - How naive of 
me to have once believed that history was a reality-based enterprise. 
Turning to the second point, that of the supposed role played by 
the United States Central Intelligence Agency in delaying Eichmann’s 
apprehension. The origin of this claim is, alas, in a noble federal project 
in which I, and my friend and co-panelist today Tim Naftali, 
participated—a nine-year effort to implement the terms of the Nazi War 
Crimes Disclosure Act of 1998.9 That statute required the federal 
government to locate, declassify and disclose to the public classified 
documents in US government possession that related to Nazi crimes and 
their perpetrators. An interagency working group was created in 1999 to 
direct this project, and I represented a succession of attorneys general 
on that group.10 In the end, more than eight million pages of documents 
were declassified and made public at the US National Archives.  
Tim described this morning some of the depressing facts about 
United States—and, by the way, one might add Soviet—intelligence 
actions that were revealed in these documents. We also hired 
independent historians who were faculty members at leading US 
universities and gave them carte blanche to prepare reports to the public 
on what they considered to be, in their own judgment, the most 
important revelations in this huge mass of documentation.  
Among the documents that our project found, declassified and 
disclosed to the public were the CIA’s records on Adolf Eichmann. 
What those records showed was that, in the 1950s, the CIA took actions 
in the Eichmann matter that were in apparent contravention of federal 
law. What did the Agency do? At the behest of a well-connected Jewish 
activist rabbi in New York, it launched a concerted effort to track down 
Eichmann in the region in which he was widely alleged to be hiding out: 
the Arab world. This was impermissible for the CIA because Congress 
had written into the ClA’s charter a prohibition against the Agency’s 
 
 8. See WALTERS, supra note 2, at 300 (which Segev cites at page 444 of his Wiesenthal 
biography). Segev’s Wiesenthal biography also cites Rosenbaum at least nine times, 
ROSENBAUM, supra note 5, which disclosed the misrepresentation made in Wiesenthal’s 1961 
book of his September 23, 1959 letter to Ambassador Sahar. 
 9. Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-246, 112 Stat. 1859, 5 
U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 2009). 
 10. Exec. Order No. 13,110, 64 Fed. Reg. 2,419 (Jan. 11, 1999).  
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exercising “police, subpoena, or law-enforcement powers.”11 Of course, 
Eichmann wasn’t found in the Arab world; he had never fled to the 
Middle East but was instead living in Argentina at the time.  
Another revelation in the CIA files: in 1960, after the Israeli 
government announced Eichmann’s apprehension, the CIA secretly 
offered to provide the Israelis with investigative assistance. Specifically, 
as Tim mentioned, the CIA offered to pore over many thousands of 
captured Nazi records in US custody that had not been used at 
Nuremberg, to search for evidence that might help Israeli prosecutors 
prove their case. The Israelis accepted the offer and the CIA thereafter 
secretly provided a large quantity of documents to the Israelis, in 
several shipments. (It should be noted in this regard that at least two 
countries refused Israeli government requests for evidentiary assistance. 
One won’t surprise you, one probably will: the Soviet Union and the 
United Kingdom.) The CIA even spied on a West German official who, 
to Israel’s alarm, was conducting research at our National Archives on 
captured Nazi documents, possibly to help prepare a demand by Bonn 
that the Israelis surrender Eichmann to be tried in West Germany 
instead of Israel. (As Professor Safferling mentioned, no such demand 
ever materialized). Over strenuous National Archives objections—
privacy objections—the CIA even provided the Israelis with duplicates 
of every document that the German official had asked to have copied 
for his government. 
However, if one looks at the New York Times coverage of what our 
disclosure effort revealed, or, alas, at the current Wikipedia entry on 
Eichmann, the aforementioned facts are not referenced at all.12 Instead, 
the claim is made that the CIA documentation that we disclosed shows 
that the CIA knew in 1958 that Eichmann was in Argentina, knew what 
his alias was, and withheld this information from the Israelis—who, had 
they possessed this information, might have launched the Eichmann 
operation a year or more earlier than they did.   
To be sure, the documentation reflects that a German intelligence 
agent mentioned Eichmann to the CIA in 1958. The CIA’s 
contemporaneous 1958 account of what the agent said, which is a small 
item buried in the middle of a long report covering many matters, reads 
in its entirety as follows: 
 
 11. 50 U.S.C. § 403-4a(d)(1). 
 12. See, e.g., Scott Shane, C.I.A. Knew Where Eichmann Was Hiding, Documents Show, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2006, at A1. 
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Adolf Eichmann ([file number:] 201-047132) was born in Israel and 
became an Obersturmbannfuehrer. He is reported to have lived in 
Argentina under the alias CLEMENS since 1952. One rumor has it 
that despite the fact that he was responsible for mass extermination 
of Jews, he now lives in Jerusalem.13 
Now query how much credence anyone at CIA who either knew 
something about Eichmann or checked into his past would have given 
this odd report. Eichmann plainly had not been born in Israel, or even in 
pre-Israel Palestine. (Records that had been captured by United States 
armed forces at war’s end confirmed that he was born in Solingen, 
Germany). And, surely, just about the last place in the world that 
Eichmann would have chosen to live in 1958 was Jerusalem. Obviously, 
he wouldn’t be hiding out on the Israeli side of what was then still a 
divided city. And it would have been nearly as inadvisable for him to 
settle in the then-Jordanian part of Jerusalem, which, he would have had 
to assume, was accessible, at least from time to time, to Israeli secret 
agents. In addition, the 1958 report’s reference to Argentina is couched 
in tentative terms (Eichmann is “reported” to have lived there), the 
report can also be read as suggesting that he may no longer be living 
there, and it contains no specifics as to where in that vast country he 
might be living. In hindsight, we know today that the alias set forth in 
the report—Clemens, C-L-E-M-E-N-S—is a variation on the false 
identity that Eichmann actually used—which was Klement, K-L-E-M-
E-N-T.   
However, even if the CIA had concluded that the obviously and 
deeply flawed German agent’s report might include some potentially 
valuable information, there was no reason to expect the Agency to share 
this information with the Israelis. To suggest otherwise is simply 
ahistorical. The CIA files prove that the Agency had no knowledge that 
the Israelis were considering, much less planning, an operation to 
capture Eichmann. Israel did a masterful job of keeping the operation 
secret. And there was scant reason to suspect that Israel would be 
prepared to conduct such a mission. After all, Israel had never acted to 
apprehend a Nazi criminal abroad, nor, by the way, did it ever do so 
again (other than an aborted effort to capture Josef Mengele of 
Auschwitz infamy at the same time that Eichmann was abducted).  
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Moreover, as a comparatively underdeveloped country—and I saw 
it in 1966 and it was still comparatively underdeveloped—surrounded 
by well-armed nations that were openly committed to Israel’s 
destruction, the young state’s military and intelligence services were 
understandably preoccupied with, literally, existential matters. Indeed, 
the CIA files show that officials inside the Agency, like the general 
publics in Israel and throughout the world, were flabbergasted by the 
May 1960 news that Eichmann had been found by and taken to Israel. 
The CIA files reveal that the Agency was extremely interested in 
determining how on earth the Israelis had managed to pull off such a 
challenging operation thousands of miles from Israeli territory.  
It should especially be recalled that, in the 1950s, following the 
mid-decade restoration of German independence, responsibility for 
pursuing justice in the Nazi cases had been relinquished by the Allies 
and returned to the Germans. The United States no longer had 
jurisdiction, or a forum, in which to prosecute Eichmann itself. For 
better or worse, the job now belonged to the Germans. Thus, the logical 
reaction inside CIA to receiving the information about Eichmann’s 
possible whereabouts from the German intelligence agent in 1958 
would have been, “It sounds like the Germans are searching for him. 
That’s great.  Perhaps they can find him and bring him before a 
German court to stand trial.”  
To suggest that the CIA should have thought to alert the Israelis is 
to commit the error of interpreting historical events not on the basis of 
what the actors knew and intended at the time but instead on the basis of 
what the world learned subsequently. This is, as I have stated earlier, 
completely ahistorical and indeed, it reflects historical ignorance. I was 
especially disappointed when Neal Bascomb’s book retelling the 
Eichmann capture story, Hunting Eichmann, was published two years 
ago.14 Like Tom Segev’s book, Bascomb’s book was the product of 
extensive research and a major publisher, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 
published it. Alas, Bascomb buys into the CIA misconduct story 
completely, and he omits all reference to the CIA’s efforts to help the 
Israelis successfully prosecute Eichmann.  
It seems that, in connection with the postwar fate of Nazi 
criminals, the world is prepared to accept only that these perpetrators 
have been tracked down primarily by self-styled “Nazi-hunters” and 
 
 14. See generally NEAL BASCOMB, HUNTING EICHMANN (2009) (omitting CIA efforts to 
help Israel prosecute Eichmann).  
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that US intelligence acted principally to obstruct efforts to pursue 
justice—or at least that’s what certain authors and publishing houses 
evidently believe the world will accept. As it happens, both premises are 
demonstrably false. 
Finally, there is the matter of the decades-long effort in some 
quarters to minimize Adolf Eichmann’s role in the Nazi genocide of the 
Jews. At trial, Eichmann famously contended that everything he did was 
a matter of obedience to superior orders. It was, he beseeched the 
judges, those who had decided to murder Europe’s Jews, not people like 
him, who, he insisted, had only carried out that decision, who should be 
held criminally responsible. The émigré Jewish philosopher Hannah 
Arendt pioneered this effort to minimize Eichmann’s responsibility, in 
her 1961 reportage on the trial in The New Yorker and in the book she 
published in 1963 based on those New Yorker articles, Eichmann in 
Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil.15 Arendt portrayed 
Eichmann as hardly more than a passive recipient of orders, a man who 
took no initiatives in connection with the destruction of the Jews.  
Many of you are familiar, I think, with the myriad of important 
errors and distortions in her book, both regarding Eichmann’s 
supposedly exaggerated responsibility for Nazi mass murder and 
regarding the conduct of the trial in Jerusalem. Justice Bach spoke very 
eloquently about the latter at lunch. We will probably never know with 
certainty what led Ms. Arendt down the path she followed. The world 
learned only in the 1990s of her secret pre-war romance with the pro-
Nazi German philosopher Martin Heidegger and of the friendly contacts 
she maintained with him until she died in 1975—a relationship that, 
according to the writer Ron Rosenbaum (no relation) contaminated both 
Arendt’s thinking about the Holocaust and her “banality of evil” 
formulation.16 Although, in Rosenbaum’s view, Arendt’s “banality of 
evil” thesis is “fatuous,” “fathomless,” and increasingly discredited, her 
book is the only book on the trial that has been continuously in print 
over the decades. The book has had an outsize influence on the public’s 
comprehension of the case, and the phrase “banality of evil” in its 
subtitle has become a hackneyed expression, applied not only to 
Eichmann, but to many other perpetrators of mass violence.  
 
 15. See generally HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE 
BANALITY OF EVIL (1963).  
 16. Ron Rosenbaum, The Evil of Banality: Troubling New Revelations About Arendt and 
Heidegger, SLATE (Oct. 30, 2009), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/life/the_spectator/2009/10/the_evil_of_banality.single.html. 
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Anyone seriously interested in the truth about the case and in the 
subject of Arendt’s treatment of it would do well to read the book that 
Justice Bach mentioned at lunch, Jacob Robinson’s essential 1965 book, 
provocatively titled And the Crooked Shall Be Made Straight: The 
Eichmann Trial, the Jewish Catastrophe and Hannah Arendt’s 
Narrative.17 Long out of print but widely available through used 
booksellers on-line, it is a 406-page, meticulously sourced, almost line-
by-line refutation of Hannah Arendt’s book. 
All who care about justice and historical truth are indebted to last 
night’s Lemkin Award recipient, Justice Gabriel Bach, not only for his 
brilliant and tenacious work on the team that prosecuted Adolf 
Eichmann, but also for his myriad efforts over the years, in public 
addresses delivered in a great many countries, to relate important facts 
about Eichmann that were conclusively proved at the 1961 trial—facts 
that established that Eichmann was far more than the mere follower of 
orders and transportation coordinator he told the court he had been.  
Justice Bach has often cited, in particular, the captured July 25, 
1944, secret cable in which Reich Plenipotentiary for Hungary Edmund 
Veesenmayer reports on Eichmann’s reaction to Hitler’s 1944 decision, 
made in order to win the assent of the Hungarian leader Miklos Horthy 
to the deportation of Budapest’s Jews, to permit some 8,700 Jewish 
families to leave Hungary. The cable states that Eichmann deplored 
Hitler’s decision to allow these Jews to survive, as “[t]he Jews in 
question are without exception important biological material, many of 
them veteran Zionists, whose emigration to Palestine is most 
undesirable.”18 Veesenmayer’s cable adds that  
it has been agreed with Eichmann that to the extent that assent will 
be given to additional evacuations of Jews from Budapest, these are 
to be carried out as far as possible suddenly, and with such speed that 
the Jews in question will already have been deported before the 
completion of the formalities.19  
 
 17. JACOB ROBINSON, AND THE CROOKED SHALL BE MADE STRAIGHT: THE EICHMANN 
TRIAL, THE JEWISH CATASTROPHE AND HANNAH ARENDT’S NARRATIVE (1965); see also Att’y 
Gen. v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, ¶ 155(e) (Jerusalem Dist. Ct. 1961) (Isr.), available at 
http://www.asser.nl/upload/documents/DomCLIC/Docs/NLP/Israel/Eichmann_Judgement_11-
12-1961.pdf (for an English translation by the Court). 
 18. VEESENMAYER TELEGRAM [VEESENMAYER CABLE] (Jul. 25, 1944) (Ger.) (on file with 
Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review); see also Att’y Gen. v. 
Eichmann, 36 I.L.R., at ¶ 155(e). 
 19. Id. 
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In other words, the goal was to deport the Jews so fast that even if 
Hitler were to agree to spare a few thousand Hungarian Jewish families, 
it would be too late for them to be saved, as they would already have 
been deported to their deaths. Talk about zeal and initiative on 
Eichmann’s part; so devoted was he to the physical elimination of the 
Jewish people that he was even prepared to threaten to sabotage an 
order from Hitler himself! 
Just one serious biography of Eichmann has been issued in 
English: Becoming Eichmann, by the British historian David Cesarani, 
published in 2004.20 Much like Arendt, Cesarani’s fundamental 
conclusion is that Israeli prosecutors “grossly inflated” Adolf 
Eichmann’s role in the Holocaust.21 He asserts that work conducted by 
historians subsequent to the trial has “tended to confirm the essence of 
[Eichmann’s] version,” namely that he was “nothing more than a 
transportation officer.”22   
It is a mystery to me how anyone can reach such a conclusion after 
studying the record of the Eichmann trial, reading the transcripts of his 
pre-trial interrogations, reading Eichmann’s hand-edited transcription of 
the tape-recorded interviews that he gave in the 1950s in Argentina to a 
confederate there, Willem Sassen, and studying the captured Nazi 
documents adduced at the trial.  
I was particularly interested to see whether Professor Cesarani 
would mention the Veesenmayer cable that I quoted a moment ago. It 
turns out that he does. However, his take on the episode is that what 
appears to be “an astonishing degree of presumption for a Lieutenant-
Colonel in the SD”23 is actually nothing of the sort.  Eichmann, he 
insists, “was not turning into a maverick: he was [instead] acting in line 
with the radicals in both Berlin and Budapest.”24 
What is especially troubling about Dr. Cesarani’s dismissal of the 
Budapest evidence is that he completely omits from his book’s 
quotation of the July 25, 1944 cable the crucial sentence referencing 
Eichmann’s hope that it will be possible to deport the Jews so quickly 
that there will not be any Jews left for Hitler to reprieve from 
deportation to their deaths. The pertinent sentence from the 
 
 20. See generally DAVID CESARANI, BECOMING EICHMANN: RETHINKING THE LIFE, 
CRIMES, AND TRIAL OF A “DESK MURDERER” (2006) (arguing that Eichmann had a diminished 
role in the Holocaust atrocities). 
 21. Id. at 119. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 185. 
 24. Id.  
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Veesenmayer cable, it should be noted, is included both in the 
Jerusalem trial court’s judgment and in Jacob Robinson’s book.25  
Inexplicably, it was not included in Eichmann chief prosecutor Gideon 
Hausner’s 1966 book Justice in Jerusalem, written in English.26 Perhaps 
Cesarani relied on Hausner’s book for his translation instead of reading 
the original German text or turning to the court’s published judgment or 
the text in Robinson’s book. Whatever the cause, the result is a 
distortion of history.   
Much as he rejects the notion that the Veesenmayer cable is of any 
significance in connection with assessing the extent of Eichmann’s 
culpability, he denies the relevance of what he concedes is the 
“notorious incident” in September 1941 in which Eichmann rejected 
suggestions that some 8,000 Jews held in Serbia be deported.27 At 
Eichmann’s trial, prosecutors introduced a document in which the Reich 
Foreign Office’s Franz Rademacher reported, following a telephone 
conversation that he had with Eichmann about these Jews: “Eichmann 
suggests shooting.”28 Cesarani is at pains to portray even this ghastly 
recommendation as being of no particular significance. In his analysis, 
since mass-shootings of Jews had been commenced in the wake of the 
June 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union and the Soviet-
occupied Baltic states, shooting Jews was “established German army 
policy and not a genocidal step advocated by Eichmann.”29 
The truth about Adolf Eichmann is that, as Auschwitz 
commandant Rudolf Hoess recalled in his postwar memoirs, he “was 
completely obsessed with the idea of destroying every single Jew that 
he could lay his hands on.”30 He was a ruthless and cold-blooded mass 
murderer, a trusted Nazi official, who devised and implemented 
diabolical initiatives that increased the pace and effectiveness of the 
Reich’s campaign of genocide. He was a senior perpetrator of the 
genocide of European Jewry. The fact that, in physical appearance, 
especially at trial in civilian clothes, Eichmann disappoints—he 
resembled a harried accountant more than, say, a Hollywood-style 
conception of an arch-murderer—cannot justify the liberties that Ms. 
 
 25. ROBINSON, supra note 17, at 31; Att’y Gen. v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R., at ¶ 155(e). 
 26. See GIDEON HAUSNER, JUSTICE IN JERUSALEM 143 (1966) (discussing the cable). 
 27. CESARANI, supra note 20, at 108. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Rudolf Hoess, Commandat of Auschwitz, in THE JEW IN THE MODERN WORLD: A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 686, 689–90 (Paul R. Mendes-Flohr & Jehuda Reinharz, eds., 2nd ed. 
1995). 
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Arendt and some of her successors have taken with the facts in order to 
downplay or even deny his senior responsibility for initiatives that were 
taken to perpetrate unprecedented crimes against humanity. 
In closing, I can only express the hope that, in the fullness of time, 
historical truth will prevail. Justice Bach is always an optimist. 
However, based on my own informed observation over more than three 
decades of work on the Nazi cases—and having seen even more 
egregious distortions of other aspects of the history of Nazi criminality 
and its aftermath perpetrated not only by Holocaust deniers but, more 
troublingly, by supposedly responsible writers—I regret that I am not 
even cautiously optimistic. 
